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Statement of the issues
The evolution of international law from a state-centred system, obsessed with the preservation of sovereignty, to a system concerned with the human condition has accelerated the development of such fields of international law as international human rights law and international criminal law. International criminal law centres 1 around the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter the 'Rome Statute' and the 'ICC') which seeks to improve the human condition by 2 promoting justice and accountability, and by preventing impunity.
The preamble of the Rome Statute affirms that prosecution for the most serious crimes 'must be Efforts to strengthen international criminal justice have thus far focused on the ICC. Two principles in particular have received much attention in discussions on strengthening the ICC. The first of these, the principle of complementarity, postulates that domestic courts have primary jurisdiction over international crimes and that the ICC has jurisdiction only in the absence of national proceedings. 3 Cooperation, the second principle, is a key principle of the Rome Statute system because without the cooperation of states the ICC cannot function. 4 Although the ICC is the central piece of the evolving system of international criminal justice -the glue that holds the system together -the system cannot develop its full potential without enhancing the capacity of states to bring perpetrators of international crimes to justice. Efforts at enhancing the capacity of national jurisdictions to contribute to the fight against impunity have tended to focus on the availability and effectiveness of national legislation. In other 5 instances, capacity building, both in terms of prosecutorial and investigative techniques and tools, has been the focus of complementarity. Nonetheless, the 6 existence of an international legal framework is just as fundamental in improving and enhancing national level action against impunity for international crimes. The Rome Statute itself is not sufficient as an international legal framework.
The purpose of this article is to assess the prospects for a comprehensive convention aimed at facilitating national level action against the alleged perpetrators of international crimes. In particular, the article will consider two recent initiatives aimed at achieving conventions to enhance national level action in relation to international crimes. The first of these is the initiative by Belgium, The Netherlands and Slovenia for a convention on mutual legal assistance with See Declaration on International Initiative (n 7). 10 respect to Rome Statute crimes (hereinafter the 'BSN initiative'). The second 7 initiative concerns the study by the International Law Commission (hereinafter the 'ILC') of crimes against humanity. Both initiatives have, at their core, interstate 8 cooperation as a central feature. The article begins by making the case that there are gaps in the international legal framework in relation to national level action against alleged perpetrators of international crimes. The case is made by considering the provisions of the Rome Statute and other international law relevant to national level action. I then describe, in turn, the salient aspects of the two initiatives. Finally, I consider the possible synergies between the two initiatives before offering some concluding remarks.
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Legal gaps: national level action
While both initiatives proceed from the premise that there is a need for greater national level action, both initiatives recognise the important role, albeit complementary, of the ICC in the international criminal justice system. The ILC syllabus for a crimes against humanity project, for example, notes that the ICC 'will remain a key international institution for prosecution of high-level persons who commit this crime.' Similarly, the Declaration on the BSN Initiative refers to 9 the ICC's role to investigate and prosecute perpetrators where states are unable or unwilling to do so. The Rome Statute system is thus central to both initiatives.
10
However, both initiatives proceed from the assumption that there are legal gaps in two specific areas of national level action, namely the obligation on States to establish and exercise jurisdiction and the duty to cooperate between States. I proceed now to evaluate these assumptions.
Obligation to exercise national jurisdiction
While both initiatives affirm the importance of the Rome Statute, both recognise that an effective international criminal justice system depends mainly on effective domestic investigation and prosecution. The ILC syllabus, for example, while recognising the centrality of the Rome Statute and the ICC, observes that 'the consider whether the proceedings were or are being undertaken, whether there has been unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances will be inconsistent with an intention to bring the person to justice, or the proceedings are not conducted independently or impartiality. Article 27(3) provides that in order to determine inability the Court shall consider whether 'due to 24 a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony' or is otherwise not able to carry out proceedings. criminalise. Moreover, at times it appears that the organs of the Court also assume the existence of a 'responsibility' on the part of States Parties to exercise jurisdiction. In the statement referred to above, the Prosecutor of the ICC clearly labels the commitment by States Parties to prosecute as a 'responsibility'. Of 30 course, in a legal sense, the word 'responsibility' does not have the same connotation (other than in the context of the secondary rules of State responsibility) as an 'obligation' or a 'duty'. However, the President of the Court in his statement quoted earlier seems to go beyond moral responsibility in his description of the commitment to assert and establish jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes. Having described the commitment as both a duty and a right, he 31 continues to state that 'states parties to the Rome Statute have an obligation to ensure that their national justice systems are capable of conducting proceedings into alleged' Rome Statute crimes.
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The notion that there is a legal obligation to establish jurisdiction has also found its way into judicial practice. In the Kenya admissibility case, the ICC PreTrial Chamber stated that in addition to having the right to exercise jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes, states 'are also under an existing duty to do so as The preambular paragraph at issue recalls that there is a duty to exercise jurisdiction, rather than seeking to establish such a duty. Whether the assumption in the preambular provision is accurate can only be determined by an assessment of state practice and whether such practice is accepted by states as law. The analysis above suggests that while States have, in some cases, enacted legislation to establish jurisdiction over international crimes, there does not exist an obligation under the Rome Statute to establish national level jurisdiction over such crimes. There is, of course, an obligation under the Genocide Convention to enact 'the necessary legislation to give effect to' the Convention and to 'provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide'. While a purely literal reading 38 of this provision would not necessarily imply an obligation to prosecute, such a Under art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the terms of a treaty are not to 39 be given a purely literal meaning, but must be given their ordinary meaning, in context and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty.
See also art VI of the Genocide Convention (n 38). international armed conflict. Given the necessity of the exercise of national jurisdiction for the effectiveness of the international criminal justice system, the lack of a legal obligation on States to establish jurisdiction for international crimes is a legal gap that could potentially be filled by the two initiatives under consideration.
Interstate Cooperation
The second potential legal gap relates to cooperation and is also linked to complementarity. Effective complementarity requires not only the criminalisation of international crimes but the ability to effectively investigate and prosecute. An essential element for effective investigation and eventual successful prosecution of international crimes is cooperation. Reflecting this importance, the Rome 44 prosecuting international crimes in Sierra Leone and Bosnia and Herzegovina, states 'to be able to investigate and prosecute [these cases], the investigators and prosecutor were having extensive, legal assistance from many countries.' Tladi 'When elephants collide' (n 4); Tladi 'ICC decisions on Chad and Malawi' (n 4). Statute creates an elaborate cooperation regime to promote the effectiveness of the ICC. Parties has also developed fairly robust, although largely ineffective, mechanisms for countering non-cooperation.
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The importance of cooperation for the Rome Statute system is also reflected in the fact that all domestic legislation implementing the Rome Statute includes a robust cooperation regime. based on complementarity and on the notion of national systems exercising jurisdiction, interstate cooperation would greatly increase the capacity of states to investigate and prosecute international crimes. As with the duty to enact legislation to criminalise international crimes, the Geneva and Genocide Conventions' requirement for cooperation is, at best, uncomprehensive and rudimentary. The First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions provides that the Parties 'shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connexion with criminal proceedings' in respect of grave breaches.
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Protocol I also contains a duty to cooperate in matters of extradition. As with the 58 duty to exercise jurisdiction, this duty applies to grave breaches only and only in the context of international armed conflict. More importantly, the duty lacks precision and does not address, for example, specifics related to the implementation of the duty, such as the types of assistance that are covered as well as the modalities for providing that assistance. Although the Genocide Convention provides for a qualified duty to extradite 'in accordance with their laws and treaties in force', it does not provide a general duty to cooperate.
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There is thus clearly a legal gap with respect to interstate cooperation. The Rome Statute, though based on the idea that domestic systems have the primary responsibility to exercise jurisdiction, does not create the obligation of interstate Ferdinandusse (n 54) lists many examples, including the attempts by Ethiopia to secure the 60 extradition of Mengistu from Zimbabwe (and even South Africa) and negative requests to Rwanda's requests for the extradition of some suspects in relation to the 1994 genocide.
See ILC Crimes against Humanity (n 8).
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The process of placing topics on the agenda of the ILC is a rather complex and sometimes long 62 process. The first step, which involves investigating the legal and theoretical merits of the topic for codification and progressive development, is placing the topic on the long-term programme of work. The topic of Crimes against Humanity was placed on the long-term programme of work during the ILC's Sixty-Fifth Session (July 2013). The Commission normally adopts a preliminary text which is then submitted to the General
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Assembly for comments (this practice is referred to as 'adoption on first reading'). After first reading, states are given time to study and comment on the text, after which the Commission adopts the final text on the basis of the comments on the preliminary text (this is known as 'adoption on second reading'). See para 1 of the ILC Crimes against humanity (n 8 Commission to complete its work on the topic and adopt a full set of Draft Articles on first reading by the end of 2016.
The project proposal is premised on the assumption that, of the three main international crimes, namely, crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, only crimes against humanity has not been the subject of a major global treaty, with the basic obligations to criminalise and to cooperate. While the Geneva 64 elaboration of a convention, as a key missing piece in the international criminal justice system. The ILC has a history of work in this field, including the 1996 68 Draft Code of Crimes. The Draft Code, for example, provides that States 'shall 69 take such measures as may be necessary to establish ... jurisdiction over' international crimes. The Draft Code also provides for a duty to extradite or 70 prosecute persons alleged to have committed international crimes. The ILC 71 topic extradite or prosecute aut dedere aut judicare had also been on the agenda of the ILC since 2005, but in 2014 the ILC decided to discontinue the project by providing a final report without producing any Draft Articles.
The ILC topic would define crimes against humanity 'for the purposes of the Convention'. According to the ILC proposal, the definition of crimes against humanity will be 'as it is defined in the Rome Statute'. The Convention would 72 oblige states to criminalise crimes against humanity in their national law in a manner that would harmonize the definition of the crime across national legal systems. Further, the ILC would propose that States exercise jurisdiction not 73 only over acts committed on its territory or by its nationals 'but also with respect to acts by non-nationals committed abroad who then turn up in the Party's territory'. Thus, the envisioned ILC Draft Convention would require states to 74 exercise universal jurisdiction if the accused person is in its territory. This type of universal jurisdiction, requiring only the presence of the accused in the territory of the forum after the commission of the alleged offence, is also envisaged in Ibid.
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other instruments such as the Convention proposed by the Crimes against Humanity Initiative.
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Additionally, the ILC would propose 'robust inter-State cooperation by the Parties for the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of the offence, including through mutual legal assistance and extradition, and recognition of evidence.' Presumably, the specific legal obligations in this regard would be 76 based on the types of provisions currently found in existing treaties on such matters. The types of assistance that could be covered under an ILC draft Convention could include, for example, assistance in the taking of evidence, service of judicial documents, execution of searches, providing information and the tracing of the proceeds of crime. Perhaps the central element of the ILC 77 project will be an obligation to prosecute or extradite, aut dedere aut judicare.
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The aut dedere aut judicare obligation, broadly stated, obliges a state to prosecute offenders present in its territory or, if it is unable or unwilling to do so, to extradite the offender to a state that is willing to do so. 79 The ILC proposal recognises that comparable conventions on other crimes have 'focused only on these core elements'. The proposal, however, notes that 80 the ILC could decide to go beyond these elements and consider other elements. 81 It is here that there is a possibility for the ILC to identify elements that could contribute to prevention, such as the establishment of cooperative early warning systems and capacity building. On the decision of the ILC to include the topic on its current agenda, Amnesty International, issued a public statement welcoming 
Challenges and hurdles
The ILC is a good forum from which to produce a text on which states can base a final convention on the domestic criminalisation and interstate cooperation in respect of Rome Statute crimes, including crimes again humanity. The ILC's working methods, involving detailed study of state practice and international law, will promote a high quality instrument which, while progressively developing the law, will be consistent with the myriad of laws and arrangements currently in place. Furthermore, while ILC members are independent legal experts skilled in the crafting of such an instrument, they assess the annual reactions by States in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly to the ILC's ongoing work, thereby allowing adjustments to take account of State preferences where possible. This notwithstanding, the ILC's decision to study this topic is not without its challenges and detractors. The challenges are both institutional and substantive. Institutionally, because of the working methods of the ILC, which requires that every Draft Article be extensively supported by doctrine, state practice and other sources of international law, the ILC's consideration of topics often takes an inordinate amount of time. However, as noted above, the ILC proposal envisions 83 that this topic will take a considerably shorter period of time due, in part, to 'the existence of analogous conventions, as well as a considerable foundation derived from the existing international criminal tribunals'. Statute. The statement of The Netherlands was more direct and went to the 85 heart of the problem. The representative of The Netherlands stated that what was required was 'an international instrument that would cover all the major international crimes, including crimes against humanity'. Implicit in this 86 statement is that by not covering genocide and war crimes, the ILC project risked fragmenting and making ineffective the very international cooperation regime that is desired. These issues had been raised by this author within the ILC and, to this end, the 2013 report of the Commission states that the 'view was expressed that the consideration of the topic in the syllabus should have taken a broader perspective, including the coverage of all core crimes'. to happen, an effective legal framework is necessary but that the current conventional framework does 'not address judicial assistance and extradition in modern terms and norms'. The Declaration commits its adherents to addressing 93 these gaps through 'a procedural multilateral treaty on mutual legal assistance and extradition to cover this gap.'
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The BSN initiative does not necessarily foresee a new definition for crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide but rather intends to rely on the definition of these crimes in the Rome Statute. The report of the Expert meeting of November 2011, organised by the initiators of the project, notes that the reference to the crimes could be made either by including 'the respective definitions from the Rome Statute' or to 'refer to the relevant provisions in the Rome Statute'. Instead of defining the crimes, the BSN initiative seeks to focus 95 primarily on interstate cooperation. The Convention foreseen by the BSN initiative, according to its authors, is to be 'based on upon existing procedural provisions from more recent treaties on mutual legal assistance.' The initiative 96 catalogues areas of cooperation such as extradition, mutual legal assistance, taking of evidence, protection of witnesses, search and seizure amongst many others.
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In addition to these core procedural obligations of interstate cooperation, the BSN initiative would also require the establishment of jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. In addition to the more traditional 98 basis of jurisdiction, territory and nationality, the BSN initiative, like the ILC project, also foresees the exercise of universal jurisdiction 'where the alleged offender is present' is in its territory. At the heart of the BSN initiative, as with 99 ILC project, is the aut dedere aut judicare principle. 
Challenges and hurdles
The BSN initiative, more than the ILC topic, is expressly meant to operate as complementary to the Rome Statute, that is, almost as an implementing agreement to the Rome Statute provisions on complementarity. In other words, the BSN initiative is borne primarily from the recognition of the gap in the Rome Statute system, and the initiative is aimed at filling this gap. There is thus a 101 conscious effort on the part of the BSN initiative to be faithful to the Rome Statute. This explains, in part, the reluctance to provide an independent definition of the crimes. The BSN initiative's attachment to the Rome Statute, while valuable and useful, creates a dilemma for the proponents. The proponents are espousing a universal convention to ensure maximum reach. The Declaration by the sponsor states, for example, asserts that the convention eventually adopted 'would be open to all States interested in enhancing their capacity to nationally prosecute these international crimes'. This is in recognition of the fact that while the 122 102 States Parties to the Rome Statute constituted a significant number, there is a large number of States outside the Rome Statute whose adherence to the envisioned convention would be important to closing the impunity gap. When coupled with the fact that many States Parties may decide, for a wide range reasons, not to join the mutual legal assistance convention, the reach of any instrument developed under the framework of the Rome Statute is significantly reduced. This has created a dilemma about the forum within which to pursue supplementary instrument -whether the term Protocol, Implementing Agreement or Supplementary Convention is used or not -might cause even some States Parties, especially from Africa, not to ratify the said instrument. In the same vein, States not party to the Rome Statute with objection to the ICC (such as India which objects in principle to the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council), might decide not to join an instrument under the Rome Statute, developed within the framework of the Assembly of States Parties, due to the institutional linkage with the Rome Statute. It is thus not surprising that the option of pursuing this instrument within the framework of the Assembly of States Parties is not seriously being considered by the proponents of the BSN initiative.
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The options being seriously considered by the proponents are the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Vienna and the General Assembly of the United Nations. In 2013, Belgium, Slovenia and The Netherlands had proposed that the Commission on Crime Prevention take up the matter of the convention on mutual legal assistance. The idea, however, was rejected and it was not even placed on the agenda. While there may have been states who had substantive reasons for rejecting the initiative, for most states (including South Africa, which is a co-sponsor), the issue was one of forum. Some states took the view that the Commission on Crime Prevention was concerned not with international crimes of the Rome Statute type, but rather with the transnational crimes. While the main co-sponsors still see the Commission on Crime Prevention as the best forum from which to address this issue, the objection that it is the wrong forum will likely prove difficult to overcome. Given the challenges of using the Commission on Crime Prevention or the Assembly of States, the General Assembly of the United Nations seems to be the most promising forum. Some proponents, however, are concerned that the General Assembly is overly politicised and that there are states likely to transpose their hostility towards the ICC to any discussions about mutual legal assistance for international crimes. Moreover, since the ILC is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the General Assembly might be reluctant to inscribe on its agenda the consideration of a subject which is already being considered by the ILC.
5
Synergies between the two projects
The ILC and BSN initiatives are both aimed at filling an important gap in the international criminal justice system by providing for an obligation to establish jurisdiction over relevant crimes and putting in place a robust interstate cooperation regime, including an aut dedere aut judicare obligation. A treaty, whether flowing from the ILC project or the BSN initiative or a combination, would enhance possibilities for effective complementarity. At first glance, the ILC topic and the BSN initiative are mutually exclusive and in competition. After all, it is difficult to see how conventions flowing from these two initiatives could simultaneously flourish (in terms of ratification and impact). The success of the BSN initiative is likely to mean the irrelevance of the ILC topic. The mutual legal assistance and aut dedere aut judicare provisions would, in all likelihood, be similar if not identical in content. Since crimes against humanity would already be covered under the BSN initiative, the value added by the ILC topic would be questionable at best. Conversely, it could be argued that if the ILC topic succeeds, the valued added by the BSN initiative would be diminished, as it would just enhance the regimes that already exist in the Genocide and Geneva Conventions. Nonetheless, given the rudimentary framework established by the Geneva and Genocide Conventions, a treaty that addresses crimes against humanity should be the preferred option.
Although the ideal goal would be to pursue a convention that addresses all three crimes, there is value in pursuing both projects. First, from a substantive perspective, the detailed study of work that goes into ILC projects provides the best option for a legally solid convention, drawing on the vast materials available, including judicial decisions, state practice and other treaties covering comparable provisions. The BSN initiative, on the other hand, as a state-centred process, will help galvanise the support of states for a global convention on the mutual legal assistance for these crimes, including crimes against humanity. There may therefore be value in pursuing both the ILC and BSN initiatives.
There is another, more strategic reason, for supporting both initiatives. The problem of forum is likely to continue to prove a stumbling block for the BSN initiative. The ILC topic, on the other hand, already has a forum and work on the topic has already begun. It is true that the ILC topic is substantively more limited than the BSN. However, the ILC topic would, on finalisation be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration by States. If the General Assembly were to decide to negotiate a convention on the basis of this text, states could propose expanding the scope of the convention to cover also genocide and war crimes in a way that captures the essence of the BSN initiative. If States were inclined to extend the ILC treaty to war crimes and genocide there is no reason why the Rome Statute definitions could not be transposed into the new treaty. Moreover, the nuts and bolts of the interstate cooperation mechanism for crimes against humanity established in the ILC topic could easily be applied to any expanded treaty.
Conclusion
While the International Criminal Court is at the centre of the international criminal justice system, it is domestic systems that have the primary responsibility for carrying out investigations and prosecutions for international crimes. Yet, the international criminal justice system does not have a sufficiently well-developed legal framework to facilitate domestic prosecution, and lacks the presence of a well-developed interstate cooperation system. The BSN and ILC initiatives to develop mutual legal assistance instruments for international crimes should be welcomed as important contributions to enhancing complementarity. It is hoped that States, as they engage with both processes, will not only support them, but seek to strengthen them. In particular, States should ensure that at a minimum any convention that flows from either the BSN or ILC project should contain certain key elements. First, the convention should establish an obligation to criminalise the relevant crimes. Second, the convention should contain an obligation to extradite offenders wanted for such offences if it decides not to prosecute (the aut dedere aut judicare obligation). Finally, the convention should contain a detailed regime on interstate cooperation.
